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Abstract
Concern about the high poverty rates experienced by children in female-headed households
has led to policies aimed at increasing these householdsincome. In this paper we present
a model that analyzes decisions made before and during marriage to invest in the human
capital of parents and children. These decisions result from a variety of anticipated post-
divorce monetary transfers between spouses.
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1 Introduction
Concern about high poverty rates among children in female-headed households has led
to policies aimed at inducing non-custodial parents to provide more support. Economists
have focused largely on the consequences of marital breakdown for adult and child welfare
as well as on the design and e¤ect of policies governing monetary transfers following
divorce and custody arrangements. The primary objective of these activities is to enhance
the well-being of children and divorced parents. Below we present a theoretical analysis of
these policies. We analyze the investments in adult human capital, made before and during
the marriage, which result from di¤erent policies. We also analyze parentsinvestment
in their children given di¤erent levels of investment. We are not aware of any study that
provides either a general equilibrium analysis of investments in parentsand childrens
human capital in a divorce-intensive environment or a similar analysis of the impact of
di¤erent policies on parentsinvestments in their own human capital.
The main contribution of the present paper is endogenizing parents investment in
their own human capital, in an economy with a positive divorce probability. In contrary
to many studies in this eld, we assume that the amount of human capital that individuals
acquire is endogenous, and show that since following a divorce, individuals do not enjoy the
whole benets of their investments in their own human capital, they alter this investment
which is also used to change the divorce probability.
We also show that any change in the policy that governing monetary transfers following
divorce, will alter both spousesinvestment in human capital and wages.
In the current paper, we establish an environment in which an individuals schooling
decisions and investment in children decisions may be analyzed together. Agents (males
and females) have two ways of transferring resources between marital states: investing
in their own human capital (by schooling or on-the-job training) or investing in children.
The return on both types of investment depends on the probability of divorce and the
policy governing divorce (both in transfers between previous spouses and the amount of
contact between each spouse and his or her children following divorce).
Schmierer (2010) shows that couples who end up divorcing have lower investments
in their children during the marriage. He shows that husbands investment decreases
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prior to the divorce and that husbands investment is a decreasing function of the divorce
probability. Empirically, he shows using the NLSY79 and PSID, that a higher probability
of divorce leads to less investment in children during the marriage.
Family economists often assume that decisions taken within a family are Pareto-
e¢ cient (Becker, 1991). However, even though there are large potential benets if a
couple can coordinate their a¤airs after marriage, two additional questions remain: Can
they coordinate their a¤airs before marriage, and how are these decisions taken within
a setup that includes divorce? The answers to both questions may a¤ect the couples
possibility of reaching a Pareto-e¢ cient result.
We show that the amount of schooling acquired by males and females substitute for
one another. A higher amount of schooling acquired by one spouse allows the other
to free ride on his spouses schooling. We also show that one set of parameters yields
two equilibria. In the rst equilibrium, males acquire more schooling than females, who
free ride on their spouses schooling. In the second equilibrium, females acquire more
schooling than males, while the latter free ride on their spousesschooling. A di¤erent set
of parameters yields only one equilibrium, in which either males or females acquire the
higher amount of schooling.
Note that the number of females who attend college has increased in recent decades,
while the number of males has remained roughly unchanged (Browning et al., 2008;
Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko, 2006). This empirical observation can be explained by
the two equilibria result. Becker, Hubbard and Murphy (2010) provide another explana-
tion for the larger number of females than males who attend college. They nd that the
cost of attending college was lower for females than for males.
One of the key stylized facts observed in the marriage market is the high degree
of assortative mating on education (Browning, Chiappori and Weiss, 2010; Lewis and
Oppenheimer, 2000). In the current paper, we assume that all males and all females are
identical, and we obtain that due to the gains from marriage, everyone marries. These
assumptions imply that all males acquire the same schooling level, and that every female
knows that her future husband will have this common schooling level irrespective of her
own schooling level. In such an economy, there is no di¤erence between potential spouses
and there is no competition over them. We expect that relaxing this assumption will
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weaken this result, but it will still hold. We intend to investigate this question in our
future work.
Another contribution of the paper is in analyzing parentsinvestment in their children
during the marriage as a function of the divorce probability and the policy that governs
monetary transfers following a divorce. The question of whether the lower economic
outcomes of children of divorced parents is the result of low incomes or the change in the
behavior of parents following the divorce, di¤erences among individuals who get divorced
or do not get a divorce, or the results of the divorce per se, is an empirical question.
Empirical evidence supporting the third option, that the lower economic outcomes of
children of divorced parents are the result of parentsbehavior during the marriage rather
than following it, can be found in Schmierer (2010), Piketty (2003), Johnson and Skinner
(1986), Tartari (2014), Bjorklund and Sundstrom (2006) and McLanahan and Sandefur
(1994).
Piketty (2003) uses the school performance of children a few years before their parents
separated and nds that they performed as poorly as children living with only one parent
did. He therefore deduces that it is parental behavior during the marriage that harms
children. Bjorklund and Sundstrom (2006) nd that individuals who experienced parental
separation in childhood obtained the same education as their siblings who grew up with
both biological parents. Hence, those studies document childrens outcomes and their
parents probability of divorcing. Tartari (2014) shows that test scores of children of
divorced parents would have been higher had the parents not divorced. Johnson and
Skinner (1986) nd a signicant e¤ect of the probability of divorce on the labor supply of
married females. McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) nd that the childs age at the time of
the familys rupture is unrelated to the risk of dropping out of school or early childbearing.
They also show that di¤erences in income between divorced and intact families account
for as much as half the di¤erence in the school achievement and early childbearing of
children in single-parent and two-parent families.
The aforementioned studies suggest that in order to understand the full impact of a
policy that governs monetary transfers following a divorce, we must analyze the parents
behavior both during the marriage and following the divorce.
In the present paper we show that if malestransfers to former spouses are a decreasing
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function of femalesincome, females have fewer incentives to acquire human capital; hence,
they spend more time with their children and less in the market. Note that, as a result
from such policy females have less incentives to spend time at the market and to acquire
human capital both during marriage and prior to it. Note also that females can be
compensated by lump sum transfers from their previous spouse.
Bernal (2008), Bernal and Keane (2011) as well as other studies show that maternal
employment and child care have a sizable negative e¤ect on childrens outcomes. Hence,
our main policy recommendation is to make malestransfers to their former spouse an
increasing function of their own wage and a decreasing function of their former spouse
wage. Note that by making monetary transfers following the divorce, decreasing function
of femaleswage, we reduce femalesconsumption, labor supply and their investment in
human capital. However, we show that it increases the amount of time they spend with
their children and their childrens human capital. We also show that shared custody, in
which one spouse (either the father or the mother) has a slightly higher amount of contact
with children following divorce, results in the highest investment in children.
In the present paper we assume that courts can force parents to any amount of mon-
etary transfer following a divorce. Weiss and Willis (1985, 1993) as well as others show
that non-custodial parents fail to make monetary transfers above a certain level. In such
an economy, we have further restrictions upon monetary transfers which are beyond the
scope of this paper. Alternatively, If courts cannot force any amount of transfer, than
we can use the model presented in the current paper to analyze of the relations between
the equilibrium transfer and parentsinvestment in their own as well as their childrens
human capital.
Our study also relates to those of Brown and Flinn (2006), Aiygari, Greenwood and
Guner (2000) and Rasul (2006) who model the role of institutions in determining the
welfare of divorced parents by governing their actions after a divorce. Following the
framework developed by them, we analyze the role of institutions during the marriage
and prior to it.
In the present paper, we do not o¤er a welfare criterion, for reasons discussed below.
However, we do present a set of policies which increase the utility of males, females and
children. However, we do analyze the change in the number of individuals who attend
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college, the labor supply and the time spent with children that result from a variety of
policies. Obviously, the government can choose the policy that increases any variable it
chooses.
The paper develops as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and presents a simplied
benchmark. Section 3 simulates and discusses policy devices that a¤ect investment in
childrens and parentshuman capital as well as the probability of divorce. Section 4
concludes and suggests directions for further research.
2 The Model
In the current paper we analyze the behavior of married individuals within a three-period
model. Each individual is forward-looking and has full information. Ex ante, individuals
di¤er only by gender.
We use a three-period model for the following reasons: A two-period model is needed
to analyze choices that individuals make before and after marriage. The third and last
period is necessary to allow for two periods after marriage: one in which the couple is
married with certainty and one in which the probability of divorce is evident.
The focus of the present paper is time invested in children that are made during the
marriage for a variety of transfers following a divorce. We ignore decisions and investments
that are made following the divorce. Those decisions are analyzed in Aiyagari, Greenwood
and Guner (2000) as well as other papers. However, as discussed in the introduction, a
large line of research (Schmierer (2010), Piketty (2003), Johnson and Skinner (1986), Tar-
tari (2014) and Bjorklund and Sundstrom (2006)) nd that the lower economic outcomes
of children of divorced parents are the results of whether their parents got divorced or not
(or the result of parentsbehavior prior to the divorce).
To simplify the analysis, we assume that all of the investments in children are made
during the marriage. Hence, under the assumption that every couple has the same di-
vorce probability, every couple makes the same investment in their children, regardless of
whether they stay married or not. As a result of this observation all adults are identical
regardless of whether their parents got divorced or not.
This assumption has two empirical implications. The rst one, which has been es-
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tablished by a large body of research that is summarized in the introduction, is that the
economic outcomes of children are a function of parentsbehavior during the marriage
(Piketty (2003), Bjorklund and Sundstrom (2006) and Tartari (2007)). The other im-
plication, which is similar to the rst one, is that the economic outcomes of children of
divorced parents are the result of their parentsprobability of getting a divorce, rather
than the divorce itself (Schmierer (2010)).
We assume that each individual is allotted one unit of time in each period. In the
rst period, each individual decides the level of his investment in his own human capital
(schooling), denoted by s. At the beginning of the second period, individuals observe the
amount of schooling acquired in the previous period by all potential spouses. Following
this observation, each individual decides whether and who to marry in a frictionless mar-
riage market. A married individual divides his time between the market and raising his
children. The time each individual spends in the labor market increases his own human
capital via experience. Divorce may occur in the third period.
We use the following notation: the term schooling is used to describe human capital
acquired prior to the marriage, the term experience is used to describe human capital ac-
quired following the marriage, and the term human capital is referring to both experience
and schooling.
We denote the probability of divorce by  and discuss it later. A divorce has two
outcomes: less contact between each parent and his or her children and the distribution
of family income between the former spouses.
The utility function of an individual in the rst and second period is given by
u = Ln (c)
where c denotes consumption.
The utility that each parent derives from the quality of his child is modied by the
amount of contact that he has with the child in each marital state. The amount of contact
with the child, given the parents marital state, is determined by the court and denoted by
. We assume that parents have complete access to their children while they are married;
hence,  of each married spouse equals 1. Though their intrinsic valuation of the child
remains the same after a divorce, both parents have less contact with their children. We
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denote females(males) amount of contact with their children by f (m).
The utility in the third period is given by
u3 = Ln (c3) + iQ (1)
Q = Ln (zqf ) + Ln (zqm) (2)
where c3 denotes consumption in the third period, which depends on the marital state,
Q denotes the childrens human capital, qf (qm) denotes the investment in children made
by females (males), and z is a technological parameter measuring the quality of the time
that parents invest in their children. We assume that childrens human capital is a function
of the time their parents spend with them only (i.e., not of monetary expenditures spent
on them). As discussed below, we assume that childrens consumption is xed in the
second period and the quality of the children is not a function of their consumption.
The question of the relative importance of monetary expenditure on children and time
spent with them on their economic outcomes is an empirical one. Baker, Gruber and
Miligan (2008) use the introduction of universal, highly-subsidized childcare in Quebec in
the late 1990s to answer this question. They nd that as a result of an increase in mothers
labor supply, children are worse o¤in a variety of behavioral and health dimensions. Ruhm
(2005) investigates the e¤ects of maternal employment on development measured at ages
10 and 11. He reports some modest negative e¤ects on cognitive development of long
hours of work in the infant and toddler years. Furthermore, the larger adverse e¤ects are
found for more advantaged children. We also motivate this assumption by noting that, as
discussed in the introduction, the lower economic outcomes of children of divorced parents
are not a function of lower income following the divorce.
To conclude, the utility function of each individual is given by Ln (c) in the rst two
periods and by Ln (c) + Q, in the third one.
Even though we use particular utility function, we provide an intuition for the general
case using income and substitution e¤ects.
In the remainder of this paper, we denote by  the amount of contact that a divorced
mother has with her children
 
 = f

; hence, 1    is the amount of contact that a
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divorced father has with his children. Recall that both spouses are presumed to have
amount of contact (which equals 1) while married.
We analyze an economy without a capital market; thus, individuals cannot borrow or
save. Each individual consequently consumes only his own income in the rst period and
only his own and his spouses incomes in the second period (the period after marriage).
This assumption allows us to concentrate on the human-capital investment incentives
resulting from the probability of divorce and transfers after a divorce.
Consumption in the rst period is given by
c1 = 1  si; i 2 (male; female) ; s 2 (sl; sh)
where si denotes schooling (which is acquired only in the rst period). We assume
that schooling is a binary choice; each individual may choose a high (sh) or a low (sl)
amount of schooling sh > sl.
The consumption in the second period di¤ers among the benchmark which is analyzed
in Subsection (2:1) and the model which is analyzed in Section (3) and we discuss it below.
We now describe consumption in the third period.
Wages in the third period are given by
W3i = 1 +Gsi + (1  qi)  (3)
where G denotes the return for schooling and  the return for experience.
We assume that all consumption by a married individual is a public good. Consump-
tion by a married individual in the third period, denoted by c3married; equals the sum of
both spousesincome and is given by
c3married = W3m +W3f (4)
The consumption of a single individual equals his income in all periods and he does
not have children.
We now describe di¤erent policies governing transfers after a divorce.
In the setup that we analyze, divorced males (females) consume m (f ) of their
income and transfer 1   m (1  f ) of their income to their previous spouses. In this
setup, malesconsumption in the case of divorce is given by (cmd). Hence,
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cmd = mW3m + (1  f )W3f (5)
while femalesconsumption in the case of divorce (cfd) is given by
cfd = (1  m)W3m + fW3f (6)
Note that we allow transfers following a divorce to be a function of femaleswages.
An economy with f = 1, in which transfers following a divorce are not a function of
femaleswages, is analyzed below.
We do not formalize childrens utility. We assume that childrens consumption is
subsumed in parental consumption (recall that all consumption is a public good) both
during marriage and after a divorce.
In modeling the behavior of married and divorced parents, an important specication
is the manner in which spouses interact. One may assume that spouses interact either
cooperatively or non-cooperatively. In the non-cooperative case, spouses make decisions
representing Nash equilibrium; in addition, the family will not, in general, achieve the
Pareto frontier. Below we assume that spouses behave non-cooperatively irrespective of
their marital state1. As discussed below, individuals derive utility from the quality of their
children as well as their consumption and both goods are public goods during marriage.
Each married individual decides upon time spend at the market, time spend with his
children and whether to divorce. We assume that each individual makes these choices
taking his spouses choices as given and those decisions are made non-cooperatively.
As discussed below, the incentives to acquire human capital in the current paper are
the results of "regular" incentives, such as the increase in an individuals income (hence
consumption). However, in the current setup, individuals have another incentive as well,
1Empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that married spouses behave non-cooperatively can be
found at Friedberg (1998) and Gruber (2004). Bonke and Browning (2009), Browning, Chiappori and
Lechene (2010) nd that there are two types of households. Sharing of expenditures does depend on who
receives the income within the rst type of households (i.e., such households behave non-cooperatively)
but not in the seond type (i.e., such households behave cooperatively). Cherchye, Demuynck and De Rock
(2013) show that the Nash-bargaining model may e¤ectively provide a good description of multi-player
con-sumption decisions.
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a "strategic motive", by acquiring additional human capital, individuals alter the divorce
probability and by doing so increasing the gains from marriage.
Our model does not have a closed form solution and we start by introducing a bench-
mark with an exogenous divorce probability. By assuming an exogenous divorce probabil-
ity, we can analyze the incentives to acquire human capital in a "classic setup" (without
a strategic motive), provide the intuition behind the main results of the paper and also
obtain a closed form solution.
Before presenting our model we discuss the behavior of a single individual. Such an
individual does not have children and consumes only his own income. Hence, the utility
of a single individual in all periods is given by
Ln (cs1) + Ln (cs2) + 
2Ln (cs3)
where csi; the consumption of a single individual in period i, equals his own wage.
We obtain that the gains from marriage are the result of both the increased consump-
tion in the second and third periods and the benets from raising children. However,
there is also a cost associated with being married, namely, the division of income between
previous spouses following a divorce.
We denote the expected lifetime utility of an individual who intends to get married by
UM and the expected lifetime utility of an individual who does not intend to get married
by US.
All individuals intend to get married if UM > US. Even though we do not have a
closed-form solution to the above condition, we assume that it holds. As a result of this
assumption, all individuals get married. To motivate this assumption, note that a single
individual does not derive utility from children and consumes only his own wage.
2.1 A Benchmark
Our benchmark entails two strong assumptions: The probability of divorce (denoted by
) is determined exogenously and wages in the second period equal 1 regardless of the
amount of schooling acquired in the rst period. Wages in the third period will depend
on schooling. Both assumptions will be relaxed in Section (3). This simplied benchmark
allows us to better understand our results and to provide a closed form solution. The
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di¤erence between the results obtained in the current and next sections are discussed at
the beginning of the next section.
In the current section, all agents (males and females) have four choices: whether or
not to marry and who, the amount of schooling they acquire and their investment in their
children - that determine their labor supply.
The income of a Type i individual (a male or a female) in the second period is given
by
1  qi
where qi denotes the investment in childrens human capital made by Type i agents.
Due to the assumption that family consumption is a public good, we obtain that con-
sumption in the second period of a married individual, c2, is given by
c2 = 2  qf   qm  K
where K denotes childrens consumption which is exogenous by assumption and dis-
cussed below2.
Thus, each female maximizes
Ln (1  sf ) + Ln (c2) + 2 (1  ) (Ln (c3married) +Q) + 2 (Ln (cdf ) + Q) (7)
over sf and qf for a given sm and qm, where  denotes the discount rate.3
The rst term of the above equation represents a females utility in the rst period, the
second term represents her utility in the second period, the third represents her utility
in the third period if she remains married, and the fourth represents her utility if she
divorces.
Recall that c3married (cdf ) denotes consumption during marriage in the third period
(femalesconsumption following a divorce) and is given by equations (4) and (6), whereas
Q denotes childrens human capital, given by equation (2) : Note that c3married; cdf and Q
are a function of sf ,qf ,sm and qm.
2The framework developed in this paper may also be used to analyze childrens consumption, K: This
discussion requires additional assumptions and we skip it for length reasons.
3Strickly speaking, an individual (whether a male or a female) maximizes his expected ability. As
discussed above, we assume that the expected utility of a married individual is higher than the expected
utility of a single individual. Hence, the probability of getting married is 1.
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Note that each male maximizes
Ln (1  sm) + Ln (c2) + 2 (1  ) (Ln (c3married) +Q) + 2 (Ln (cdm) + (1  )Q) (8)
over sm and qm for a given sf and qf .
Recall that cdm denotes males consumption following a divorce.
The probability of divorce a¤ects the level of married individualsinvestment in their
human capital as well as that of their children. It also a¤ects the investment in human
capital of an unmarried individual who internalizes this probability.
In this setup, we may draw several conclusions:
Corollary 1 If males and females choose the same amount of schooling then females
(males) invest more in their children than males (females) when  > :5 ( < :5) :
Proof. Using the rst-order conditions of Equations (7) and (8) :
Corollary 2 An increase in either f or m, with m (f ) and the amount of schooling
held constant, decreases both malesand femalesinvestment in their children.
Proof. Using the second-order conditions and the implicit-function derivative.
In other words, an increase in f (recall that females transfer 1 f of their income to
their former spouses) increases femalesconsumption following a divorce. However, it also
increases femalesincentives to acquire human capital. Recall that, a female that acquires
additional human capital spends less time with her children. Under the assumption that
childrens utility is an increasing function of the time their parents spend with them,
we obtain that as a result from an increase in f , the welfare of children is decreased,
regardless of whether their parents got a divorce or not.
The result of this corollary represents the papers main policy recommendation. By
allowing post-divorce transfers to be a decreasing function of femaleswage and an in-
creasing function of maleswage, the investment in children will increase. As a result of
such transfers, females have fewer incentives to acquire human capital, they work less and
spend more time with their children. Another result of such transfer is that males have
fewer incentives to acquire human capital, they work less and spend more time with their
children as well. Hence, a government wishing to increase investment in children should
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decrease both f and m. If females do not enjoy all the benets of their wages later
in life, they will have fewer incentives to invest in their own human capital and greater
incentives to invest in their childrens human capital. Note that the intuition behind our
policy recommendations does not depend on our chosen utility function.
We now turn to an analysis of the investments in schooling made by both types of
individuals (males and females). The level of investment is given by a Nash equilibrium
in which each individual chooses his or her amount of schooling, while taking as given the
amount of schooling chosen by individuals of the other.
We obtain two main results. The rst one is that the individual with the lower amount
of schooling, free rides on his spouses superior education (and third period wage) and
the existence of two equilibria. The second nding is the relations between the monetary
transfers following a divorce and the amount of schooling acquired prior to the marriage.
In the current paper, we assume that all males and all females are identical, and due to
gains from marriage, we obtain that everyone marries. This implies that all males make
the same choice of education, and that any female knows that her future husband will have
this common male educational level irrespective of her own educational choice. In such
an economy, there is no di¤erence between potential spouses and there is no competition
over them. We expect that relaxing this assumption will weaken this result but it will
still hold. We intend to investigate this question in our future work.
Formally, we can show that:
Corollary 3 Several parameters of the model yield two equilibria. In the rst equilibrium
males acquire the higher amount of schooling (sh) while females acquire the lower amount
of schooling (sl) : In the second equilibrium females acquire the higher amount of schooling
(sh) while males acquire the lower amount of schooling (sl).
Proof. Using the FOC of equations (7) and (8) with respect to s we obtain that for
G = 0 all individuals acquire the lower amount of schooling and that there exists G such
that all individuals acquire the higher amount.
Consider the equilibrium that we obtain in an economy where the court divides di-
vorced spouses income equally (f = m = 0:5) and  = 0:5. We denote by G; the
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schooling premium that makes individuals of one type (either males or females) indi¤er-
ent between sl and sh, while individuals of the other type choose sl.
Using the FOC of equations (7) and (8) with respect to s, one can show that, if
males choose sl they enjoy a strictly higher utility if females choose sh. Hence, if G =
G and females choose sh males choose sl. However, note that if G = G and males
choose sh then females choose sl. Hence, if the courts divide divorced spousesincome
equally (f = m = 0:5) ; there exists G such that individuals of one type acquire the
high amount of schooling, while individuals of the other type acquire the low amount of
schooling.
As discussed in the introduction, Browning, chiappori and Weiss (2008) and Goldin,
Katz, and Kuziemko (2006) nd that the amount of schooling acquired by males remains
constant over time, regardless of the change in the return on schooling, an observation
that can be explained by the model presented in the current paper.
We explain the above outcome by using the return for schooling, G. The argument
remains when we analyze increases in the probability of divorce rather than the return to
schooling.
Note that the number of equilibria in the model either one or two is a function
of the parameters. If the return to schooling is su¢ ciently high, both males and females
acquire the high amount of schooling; if it is su¢ ciently low, they acquire the low amount.
For a medium return to schooling, we obtain that only one type of individual acquires
the higher amount of schooling.
Next we analyze the case in which malesincome surpasses femalesand f = 1; hence,
transfers following a divorce are not a function of femaleswages. In this case, we nd
that if there is only one equilibrium, then females acquire more schooling than males.
We prove this by using the rst-order conditions of equations (7) and (8). The intuition
behind this result is the following: Females acquire more schooling than males due to the
income e¤ect (they are poorer) as well as the substitution e¤ect (they enjoy a larger share
of their own wage than males).
14
3 Endogenous Divorce Probability
Two di¤erences separate the economy in this section from that in the previous one. First,
individuals derive utility from the quality of the match with their spouse, hence, the
probability of divorce is determined endogenously; second, wages in the second period are
a function of schooling. In subsection (3:1) we will discuss the robustness of the results
for each di¤erence.
We obtain that the behavior of individuals with a higher outside option (i.e., higher
utility following a divorce) di¤er from the behavior of individuals with low outside option
(i.e., lower utility following a divorce). Individuals with higher outside option behave in
a similar way to the way discussed in the previous section, while individuals with lower
outside option, who have more incentives to alter the divorce probability, change their
behavior.
We assume that the quality of the match, , is not observable at the date of the
marriage but fully revealed by the end of the second period. At the end of that period,
, is drawn from a uniform distribution over the set [ t; t]. The utility of a married
individual, (male or female) in the third period is given by
umarried = Lng (c3married) + Q+ 
where  is the weight of preference given to childrens human capital and  is the
preference weight on consumption. Based on this preference in addition to divorce laws,
spouses decide to stay married or divorce. We assume a unilateral divorce regime; there-
fore, the couple enters the state of divorce if one spouse requests it.
We denote by divf (divm) the probability that females(males) outside alternative
surpasses that of males(females).
divf = Probability
 
ufd > u
married

=
1
2
  E
 
umarried
  ufd
2t
(9)
divm = Probability
 
umd > u
married

=
1
2
  E
 
umarried
  umd
2t
where E
 
umarried

denotes the expected utility of each individual in a couple that remains
married. Note that E
 
umarried
   ufd > 0 due to the gains from marriage, hence divf
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and divm are both positive and lower than 0:5. However, divf and divm might be lower
than 0. Hence, the probability of divorce, ; is given by
 = max (divf; divm; 0) (10)
The couples income (which equals their consumption) in the second period is given
by
c2 = (1 +Gsm) (1  qm) + (1 +Gsf ) (1  qf )
while wages in the third period are given by (3), as in the previous section.
Thus, each female maximizes
Ln (1  sf ) + Ln (c2) + 2
 
(1  )umarried + ufd

(11)
over sf and qf for a given sm and qm.
While each male maximizes
Ln (1  sm) + Ln (c2) + 2
 
(1  )umarried + umd

(12)
over sm and qm for a given sf and qf .
In this section of the paper, each agent has ve choices: whether or not to marry
and who, the amount of schooling he acquires, their investment in their children (which
determines his or her labor supply during the second period) and whether to divorce.
Since the rst-order conditions of this maximization problem do not have a closed-form
solution, simulations must be used.
Before presenting our results we indicate the parameters used. Recall that  denotes
preference weight on consumption, G the return for schooling,  the return for experience,
 femalesamount of contact with their children, t the boundaries of the quality of the
match distribution, z is a technological parameter measuring the quality of the time that
parents invest in their children,  the weight of the preference given to childrens human
capital and  the discount rate.
We use  = 2;  = :8; G = 3;  = :5; t = 5; z = 3;  = 1; sl = :3; sh = :4;  = 1.
We turn to a discussion of the chosen parameters. Recall that the results of the an-
alyzed policy devices are a function of the amount of schooling acquired by each spouse,
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whether the economy is in an equilibrium in which males acquire the high amount of
schooling, or an equilibrium in which females acquire the higher amount of schooling (re-
call that some parameters result in two equilibria), and whether malesoutside alternative
surpass femalesor vice versa.
Estimating the parameters used is beyond the scope of this paper. Estimating the
parameters recquires estimating a production function of childrens outcomes as a function
of the time spent with them. Note also that it requires data of long periods since parents
invest over long periods and we did not estimate the parameters used. Browm and Flinn
(2011) estimate a similar setup and obtain di¤erent parameters. However, in their setup,
childrens outcomes are a function of monetary investments while in the current setup
childrens outcomes are a function of the time their parents spend with them. Hence, the
estimated coe¢ cients do not represent the variables of the current model.
The parameters were chosen in order to present the potential outcomes of each policy
device. Using our chosen parameters, we obtain that both males and females choose
the high and low levels of schooling in each analyzed policy device. We also obtain
that for each analyzed policy, malesoutside alternative surprass femalesfor a subset of
parameters, while femalesoutside alternative surpass malesfor a di¤erent subset in each
of the policies analyzed in Figures 4-8. In Figures 1-3, which show the results obtained
for an exogenous increase in the divorce probability, not a policy change, femalesoutside
alternative surpass malesfor each value of t; the boundaries of the quality of the match
distribution.
The foregoing parameters and m = f = :75 yield two equilibria. In the rst equi-
librium, females choose the higher amount of schooling (:4) while males free ride on their
potential spouses schooling and choose the lower amount of schooling (:3). As a result,
males enjoy higher consumption in the rst period. In this equilibrium, qm = :15; qf = :28
and  = :36: In the second equilibrium, males choose the higher amount of schooling (:4)
while females free ride on their potential spouses schooling and choose the lower amount
of schooling (:3). In this equilibrium, qm = :039; qf = :411 and  = :344:
We solved the benchmark model (with an exogenous divorce probability and a xed
second period wage) with the foregoing parameters and the divorce probability which was
calculated above ( = :36 and  = :344) ; and obtain only one equilibrium in which both
17
males and females acquire the low amount of schooling (:3), qf = 0:55 and qm = 0:42 (The
di¤erence between the calculated values of qf and qm when we used  = :36 and  = :344
was less than 0.01).
In Subsection (3:1) we provide the results obtained in a model similar to the model
used in the benchmark. I.e., the results obtained if the divorce probability is exogenous,
as well as the results obtained if second period wages are not a function of schooling.
Note that the behavior of individuals with a lower outside alternative is similar to their
behavior in the benchmark case in each policy.
In the following gures, we show the investments in schooling and in the childrens
human capital for the chosen parameters; we also show the divorce probabilities resulting
from those investments.
In Figures (1)   (3) we use m = f = :75 while changing the divorce probability
by assigning t values between 2 and 12. In Figures (4) and (5) we use f = :75 while
changing m. In Figures (6) and (7) we use m = :75 while changing f . In Figures (8)
and (9) we use m = f = :75 while assigning  values between :4 and 1. Note that the
gures entitled qf and qm represent Ln(z qf ) and Ln(z qm).
After completion of the study proper, we performed two robustness checks. We show
that the results are robust to changes in the parameters (G;  and ). We also show that
the results are robust to changes in both the assumptions, which di¤er from the previous
section of the paper (i.e., endogenous divorce probability and wages in the second period
that are a function of schooling acquired in the rst period).
Here we analyze the intuition behind our results, specically, that investments in
parents like childrens human capital depend on the probability of divorce. Note
that any change in f or m modies consumption after a divorce. Therefore, it has a
direct e¤ect (which has subsequent income and substitution e¤ects) and an indirect e¤ect
through the endogenous divorce probability (the strategic motive).
Part of the intuition behind the following results stems from the following observation:
When the couples total income is divided equally between them, we obtain divf > divm
(femalesoutside alternative surpasses that of males) because we assume that females
have more contact with their children than do males in the event of divorce. We show
below that the observation that divf is greater than divm remains valid for a large set
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of parameters.
We begin analyzing the model by discussing an exogenous increase in t, the lower and
upper boundaries of the quality of the match distribution, which results in an exogenous
increase in the divorce probability (Recall that the quality of the match, , is drawn
from a uniform distribution over the set [ t; t]). Recall, too, that some parameters yield
two equilibria. The rst equilibrium is characterized by females choosing sh and males
choosing sl; we refer to this equilibrium as FH (Female High). The second equilibrium
is characterized by females choosing sl and males choosing sh, which we refer to as FL
(Female Low).
We divide the discussion into two parts, by equilibrium. We discuss the FH equilib-
rium rst.
Figures 1-3 show the outcomes of an exogenous increase in t. We assume that upon a
divorce, each spouse transfers 0:25 of his income to his former spouse, (af = am = :75).
Females, however, have a higher amount of contact with their children than do males, so
( = :7). The increase in the probability of divorce has both income and substitution
e¤ects on both spouses. The substitution e¤ect traces to the change in the probability
of divorce and, hence, to the need to divide income. Note that the income e¤ect results
from lower consumption and lower amounts of contact between parents and children after
a divorce.
An increase in the probability of divorce reduces males and females investments
in their children, but also increases their investment in their own human capital (via
experience). These changes are the result of the substitution e¤ect. By comparing Figure
1 (with  = :7 < af = :75) with Figure 2 (with  = :8 > af = :75), we nd that as
a result of an exogenous increase in the probability of divorce, females may decrease or
increase their investments in children for di¤erent relations between  and af :
Another result of an exogenous increase in the probability of divorce is an increasing
function of the investments in schooling. The increase in schooling among Type i indi-
viduals raises their wage in both periods, hence reduces the incentives to spend time with
their own children due to the substitution e¤ect, while increases it due to the income
e¤ect. Using those gures we can also show the change in the time spent with children
by both parents, when individuals of one type choose the high amount of schooling.
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The main outcomes of the FL equilibrium (characterized by females choosing sl and
males choosing sh) are presented in Figure 3.
We now analyze an increase in am (Recall that males transfer 1 am of their income to
their previous spouses). The main outcomes are presented in Figures 4 and 5. As before,
we divide the discussion into two parts: If the model yields two equilibria, we begin the
analysis by discussing the FH equilibrium. One can see that an increase in m decreases
the probability of divorce when femalesoutside alternative surpasses that of males (hence,
divf > divm prior to am < :86) and increases it when malesoutside alternative surpasses
that of females. An increase in m increases malesinvestments in children for a xed
amount of schooling when femalesoutside alternative surpasses those of males. However,
if malesoutside alternative surpass females, males have more incentives to reduce the
divorce probability and an increase in m decreases malesinvestment in their children.
The increase in m changes malesincentives to acquire schooling. As Figure 4 shows,
for am > 0:51, males choose sh. For am > :69, however, females increase their investment
in schooling and males free ride on their potential spouses schooling while decreasing
their own.
Note that the increase in females schooling and the decrease in males schooling
changes the amount of time each of them spend with his children. It increased the
amount spent by females and decreases the amount spent by males.
Intuitively, an increase in m "directly" increases malesincentives to acquire addi-
tional human capital (via experience), due to the substitution and income e¤ects, and
increases females incentives to acquire additional human capital due to the income ef-
fect. However, it also changes the divorce probability and provides a di¤erent kind of
incentives. Individuals can make investments that reduces the divorce probability.
If femalesoutside alternative surpasses that of males, then males have "more to gain"
by remaining married. An increase in m, decreases females outside alternative and the
divorce probability, in that case males increase their investment in children in order to
decrease the divorce probability. Note that, when malesoutside alternative surpasses
females, males decrease their investment in children as a result of an increase in m; due
to the substitution e¤ect, since they enjoy a larger share of their own wage following the
divorce.
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The main outcomes of the FL equilibrium are presented in Figure 5.
The main outcomes of an increase in f are presented in Figures 6-7. The probability
of divorce is a decreasing function of f when malesoutside alternative surpasses that of
females (for f < :67) and is an increasing function otherwise.
An increase in f decreases females investments in children for a xed amount of
schooling. Malesinvestment in their children is an increasing function of f when their
outside alternative surpasses that of females and decreasing otherwise.
Note that in all of the above gures, malesinvestments in children is more sensitive
than are femalesinvestments for a xed amount of schooling. Also note that the equi-
librium in which females acquire more schooling is characterizes by lower investments in
children.
Recent legislative amendments in the U.S. and Western Europe advocate shared cus-
tody or more moderate increases in fathersaccess to their children upon a divorce. Domi-
nus (2005) and Cook and Brown (2005) documented those changes for the U.S. The pro-
posed model allows us to analyze those changes by altering . Figure 8 shows the results
for  2 (:4; 1) while retaining f = m = :75.
An increase in  results in an increase in the divorce probability when femalesoutside
alternative surpasses that of males (which occur if females acquire the higher amount
of schooling and for  > 0:66 if males acquire the higher amount of schooling). Males
investments in their children are a decreasing function of  while femalesare an increasing
function of the same variable. The total investment by both spouses is a decreasing
function of  for  < 0:55 in both equilibria. Furthermore, for  > 0:5 ( < :5), the sum
of both spousesinvestments in children is higher (lower) in the FL(FH) equilibrium. The
highest investment in children is obtained by giving the spouse with the higher amount
of schooling an amount of contact that is slightly above :5.
Intuitively, an increase in  increases females incentives to spend time with their
children, hence decreases the time spent at the market. The lower time spent at the
market reduces the amount of schooling which is acquired by females.
We do not o¤er a welfare analysis in the present paper. Using simulations, we can show
that females utility is a decreasing function of m and an increasing function of f while
the opposite is true for males (Note that it is note the result of the envelope theorem due
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to the strategic motive and the behavior of individuals of the opposite gender). Hence,
the government can generate a Pareto improvement by calculating the maximum level of
males utility for a given level of femalesutility.
However, the main contribution of the present paper is analyzing the results from a
variety of policies and a government can choose the policy that increases any variable it
chooses.
3.1 Robustness check
We performed two robustness checks. In the rst one, we show that the results are
robust to the chosen parameters. In the second, we test the robustness of the results to
the assumptions that di¤er from the previous section (exogenous divorce probability and
xed wage in the second period) and discuss the impact of each relaxed assumption on
the results obtained in this section. We treat the construct analyzed at the beginning of
this study (i.e., the model analyzed on section (3)) as the original construct.
We show that the results of the paper are robust to all of the robustness checks we
perform. In this subsection we provide the exact results obtained in each robustness check.
We begin by testing the robustness of our results to the chosen parameters. Recall
that we simulated and presented the results for a change in  and t in the previous section.
Here we discuss the results of changes in the other parameters.
Our results showed that a change in G (the return for schooling),  (the discount rate)
or  (the return for experience) modied the incentives to acquire schooling and to invest
in children. As a result, the two-equilibria result does not persist for any G and .
We ran the simulation with various parameter values and obtained the following: When
we increase f while keeping the parameters of the original construct (in a way similar to
the analysis of Figures 6 and 7), all individuals choose the low amount of schooling when
 > 1:4, and the higher amount of schooling for G > 3:96.
If we assign G values between 3.95 and 3.62, females choose the lower amount of
schooling for all parameters while males choose the higher amount of schooling for several
values of the parameters. For values of G that are lower than 2.5, all individuals choose
the lower amount of schooling. If we assign G values between 2.5 and 2.84 to , females
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choose the lower amount of schooling while males choose the higher amount for several
values of the parameters. For values between 2.84 and 3.62, we obtain that males and
females acquire the lower or higher amount of schooling for a di¤erent values of f (some
parameter values result in two equilibria).
For values of  lower than 1:4, only males choose sH while females continue to acquire
the lower amount of schooling; females choose the higher amount of schooling if  < 0:74.
This value of  results in two equilibria for several values of f :
Next, we ran the simulation with an increase in m (instead of an increase in f) and
obtain a similar results.
When we assign , the discount rate, values between 0:4 and 1, we obtain a decrease
in both the investment in children made by both spouses and the amount of acquired
schooling. The intuition is straightforward: schooling is acquired in the rst period while it
increases wages in the second and third periods, while investment in children are performed
in the second period and individuals derive utility from them in the third one.
For values of  higher than 1:48, all individuals choose the lower amount of schooling;
for values between 1.48 and 0.7, only females choose the higher amount of schooling for
some range of the parameters. Lower values of result in two equilibria.
We also ran the simulation while assigning z a variety of parameter values (between 2
and 4). This manipulation only altered the magnitude of the changes in the investment
in children without changing any of the qualitative results.
The next test run was a simulation with an exogenous (xed) divorce probability
( = :35). As in the original construct, this elicited one set of parameters that result in
individuals of one type choosing the higher amount of schooling and individuals of the
other type choosing the lower amount; the other set produced two equilibria. However,
when malesoutside alternative surpasses that of females (as in the original construct),
males invested less in their children and both males and females acquire the lower amount
of schooling for a larger set of parameters.
The third test entailed a simulation with a xed wage (equal to 1) in the second
period (similar to the benchmark construct). In this construct, we nd that both types
of individuals acquire the lower amount of schooling and invest more in their children.
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4 Conclusions
The economic literature analyzes a variety of policies designed to reduce poverty and in-
crease the economic outcomes of divorced families and their children. In the presented
model we analyze those policies having endogenous investments in human capital. We
show that a change in monetary transfers following a divorce or the allocation of the cus-
tody rights of each spouse alters the amount of human capital acquired and the investment
in children.
The model describes the behavior of a household during three periods of its lifetime.
In the rst period, each agent acquires human capital and consumes his or her own
income. In the second period, the individual gets married, consumes, and invests in his
or her children and in augmenting his or her own human capital. In the last period each
individual observes a shock that may cause him to divorce.
The behavior of individuals who do not marry but do cohabit can be analyzed in the
same way; however, the transfer policy following a divorce can di¤er between individuals
who marry and those who cohabitate.
We show that males and females face di¤erent incentives for choosing how much to
invest in human capital. Females who invest more in their children than males acquire
less experience and consume less than males after a divorce. By implication, females may
acquire more schooling than males and, by so doing, increase their income after a divorce.
Another nding is that individuals free ride on their spousesschooling. If an individual
of one type acquires more schooling, individuals of the other type acquire less schooling
and consume more due to their spouseshigher wages.
Another contribution of our model lies in its analysis of a variety of policies. We show
that the investments that both parents make in their children while they are married
result from the di¤erent policies that govern transfers after a divorce and the amount of
contact that each parent has with his or her children after a divorce. An interesting and
unintuitive result is that an increase in the monetary transfers that males make to former
spouses reduces their childrens welfare for a large set of parameters.
The framework developed in this paper may also be used to analyze the question of
commitment to alimony payments when the court cannot enforce its decisions perfectly.
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Another direction of future research is to endogenize the number of children. Finally,
the collection and analysis of data on wages and the acquisition of human capital as a
function of the divorce rate may lend further support or indicate possible adjustments
to the model constructed in this paper.
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Figure 1: FH (This equilibrium is characterized by females choosing sh and males choos-
ing sl), an increase in t (the lower and upper boundaries the of the quality of the match
distribution), =0.7 (femalesamount of contact with their children).
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Figure 2: FH, An increase in t (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Figure 4: FH, An increase in m, i.e. a decrease in males transfer to their previous
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Figure 6: FH, an increase in f , i.e. a decrease in malestransfer to their previous spouse.
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Figure 7: FL, an increase in f
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Figure 8: FH, an increase in , femalesamount of contact with their children.
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Figure 9: FL, an increase in 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